Introduction
There is growing empirical evidence to support the proposition that there are spatial patterns of voting in Britain over and above those that reflect compositional effectssimilar people do not necessarily vote in the same way wherever they live (Johnston and Pattie, 2006; Cutts and Webber, 2010) . Central to this claim is the observation that voting is a learned activity which takes place in a variety ofcontexts and through a range of mechanisms at severalspatialscales (Cox, 1969; Agnew, 1987; Taylor and Johnston, 1979; Johnston and Pattie, 2006) . Voters are influenced by the contexts within which they find themselves, and these contextual effects complement the compositional effects representing individual characteristics such as social class, and derive from a variety of sources, including individuals interacting with their material environment, with theirsocial networks, and/or with political parties through placespecific campaigning.
The nature and impact of constituency party campaigning in British general elections has been the subject of much research over recent decades. One group of scholars hasused data from candidates' agents to show that intensive campaign effort yields a greater electoral payoff (Denver and Hands, 1997) ,findings that are broadly consistent with studies conducted since the 1970s usingthe amounts that a candidate spentas a surrogate measure of campaign intensity (Johnston and Pattie, 1995; Pattie and Johnston, 2009 ).Local party spendingdoes not win votes directly, but it facilitates the canvassingand mobilisationof supporters and the follow-up targeting of key votersas well as meeting the costs of leaflets, posters and other campaign literature.
British elections are won or lost inkey battleground seats -the marginal seats -where party activity is at its most intense. Reflecting this, not only have local campaigns become more professional and centralised (Fisher et al, 2006) , but circumstantialevidence suggests that candidates are active in canvassing support and building up their local profiles well before the election campaign begins, especially in marginal constituencies and/or target seats Fisher andDenver, 2008; Cutts, 2006a; 2006b; Johnston and Pattie, 2010) . Local campaigning has also becomehighly visible through the increasing use of postersdisplaying the local candidates' name, street stalls intown centres and local shopping precincts, as well as party workers out 'flying the flag' -wearing party badges and other merchandisewhile canvassing or leafleting. This enhanced public profile of campaigns in target seats led Cutts and Webber (2010) to speculate that there may be positive spillover effects from intensive party activityfrom one Parliamentaryconstituency to its neighbours (see also Johnston and Pattie, 2008) . By explicitly taking account of spatial effects in the modelling process, they identified evidence that the more a party spends on campaigning in constituencies adjacent to another, the better its performance in the latter.Adrawback of thatstudywas that, because of the limited data available,itonly analysedspending on the 'official' or short campaign, the few weeks between the election being called and polling day.However, this is problematic, as parties can be engaged in activities to raise their local profiles in key constituencies many months before the election occurs. Both the direct campaign effect and the spillover to surrounding seats may well be influenced by this longerterm local campaign effort, which previous studies have been unable to capture. That said, a potential solution is now available. For the2010 general election, legal restrictions on campaign spending also coversthe so-called long campaign (the last four months before the election is called) as wellas the short campaign (Johnston et al., 2011 (Johnston et al., , 2012 .
Party campaigning occurs in places, making it unsurprising that there is an increasing amount of empirical evidence supporting the proposition that spatial variations in voting patterns exist (Johnston and Pattie, 2006; Johnston et al, 2007) and thatspatial heterogeneity and autocorrelation should be considered when attemptingto examine the driversof political support (Cutts and Webber, 2010) .The presence of spatial autocorrelation in a data set can indicate a number of issues that may confound its analysis. For example,positive autocorrelation in regression residuals may indicate that the model is under-specified -the spatial clustering of positive values suggesting other variables that should be included (such as the percentage employed in agriculture if positive residuals are clustered in rural areas). Alternatively, it may indicate the presence of spillover effects across neighbouring constituencies: factors which influence support for a party in one constituency could have an impact on voters living in adjacent seats -because they are aware (perhaps through travel there) of the intensity of the campaign in the neighbouring seats and are influenced by that activity in their voting decisions. This latter spatial process -of diffusion, spread or, as we prefer here, spillover -is likely to operate with regard to local campaigns: a party's intense campaign in one place (indexed by the amount spent on it) could influence not only its support there but also inneighbouring places. The effect of campaigning in neighbouring seats is often interpreted as a positive spillover effect, but it is probable that it also has a negative effect too. The harder a party campaigns in the seats neighbouring yours, the more your opponents' local resources are tied down responding to this increase in spending, and the more difficulty they'll have in justifying the redirection of those finite resources to your seat, which would make it marginally easier for you to capture the seat.
In addition, spatial autocorrelation in the geography of the dependent variable may indicate a technical problem regarding the selection of areas for analysis. In Britain there are blocks of constituencies where one party performs much better than elsewhere because of an underlying geography of factors influencing voter choicesuch as the geography of social class. If those blocks of constituencies are unequal in size, then the relative impact of each constituency on the overall regression model will vary, and as a consequence the standard errors will be under-estimatedand/or the populationof observations unequally weighted. To eliminate that potential problem, spatial error models introducing lag effects for the dependent variable are used to remove the autocorrelation. Both spillover and spatial lag effects are explored in the current paper.
In the next section we stress the importance of geography on voting in British electionsandexamine reasons why space should be taken into account in its modelling. Section 3outlineskey hypotheses to be tested, the modelling approach and the explanatory variables to be used. Section 4 presents an exploratory spatial analysis to illustrate the geographical element to party vote shares and party spending patterns acrossBritain and reiterates the need to take account of spatial heterogeneity when examining patterns of party support. Econometric estimations are presented in Section 5whichshow thatlocal party activism during both the long and short campaign matters, before testing hypotheses regarding the presence of spillover effected -that partiesobtaina greater electoral payoff in a constituency if theyrun intensive, highly visible campaigns not only there but also in constituencies adjacent to that constituency.Our final model tests whether these findings hold after taking account of spatial autocorrelation inthe dependent variable.
The Geography of Voting in Great Britain
There is a growing empirical literature which emphasises the existence and intensity of spatial variations in vote shares. Early studies provided circumstantial evidence that similar people vote differently in different types of places (Cox, 1969; Crewe and Payne, 1971) while others put forward arguments consistent with the neighbourhood effects thesis (Butler and Stokes, 1969; 1974) ;the spatial polarisation of party support exceeded what might be expected given the socio-demographic polarisation of the population (Miller, 1977; 1978) . This is often attributed to the idea that 'people who talk together, vote together' (Miller, 1978) , especially people in the same kinship networks (Pattie and Johnston, 2000) . Early criticisms mainly focussed on the apparent lack of evidence of how such processes operated (Dunleavy, 1979) even though subsequent analyses during the 1980s clearly showed that sociodemographic composition could not account for party support at the constituency level (Johnston et al, 1988) . Later studies have generally upheld the existence of neighbourhood effects in British elections (Heath and Andersen, 2002; Pattie and Johnston, 2000) . For instance, use of 'bespoke neighbourhoods' 1 not only provided evidence of small scale, individual levelspatial variations in voting (Johnston et al., 2004; 2007) but also found that people from similar social backgrounds voted differently depending on their local context. Suchneighbourhood effects apparently operatedat a variety of scales nesting within each other (Johnston and Pattie, 2006) ; people were found to follow similar patterns of political behaviour where they livedin close proximity, interactedwith others, sharedday-to-day experiences, and belonged to the same socialnetworks (Johnston et al, 2005; Books and Prysby, 1991; 1999; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995) .
Other important studies of inter-constituency variations in party support have focused on the impact of party activism (Denver and Hands, 1997; Pattie and Johnston, 2009; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2009) . Local electioneering has now become a vital part of contemporary general election campaigns. At the constituency level, parties focus efforts on key marginal seats,targetingkey voters both prior to and during the election campaign. Three different groups of scholars, using different measures of campaign strength, have regularly demonstrated the electoral benefits of intense local campaigns in the UK (Denver and Hands, 1997; Pattie et al., 1995; Whiteley and Seyd, 1994) , while one team has recently combined these measurements of campaign effort and confirmed that, other things being equal, the more activelya party campaigns in a seat the more votes itwinsand the fewer votes itsopponents get (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2009 ):parties often benefit more when they are challenging than when they are the incumbent party in the constituency (Pattie and Johnston, 2009) . There is also growing evidence that parties through highly developed local targeting strategies and grassroots local activism, party organisationsnow successfully operate at spatial scales below the constituency level in order to maximise their potential electoral rewards (Cutts, 2006a; 2006b ).
Arecent analysis of campaigning at the 2005 general election identified potential positive spillover effects in party supportin constituencies contiguous to those where there was intense party activism:vote shares in constituency i were strongly influenced by highly visible campaigning in i's neighbouring constituencies. (Cutts and Webber, 2010) . Such non-independencemay be due to, amongst other things, feedback forces, 2 as well as grouping forces (Voss et al, 2006; Anselin, 2001; Wrigley et al, 1996) . 3 The assumption that geographically contiguous parliamentary constituencies with similar party vote shares might be influenced by grouping forces, such as intense party activism,is not entirely new, however.Previous work had found that the Liberal Democrats improved their local election support following intensive activism in areas surrounding those where they won at the previous contest (Dorling, Rallings and Thrasher, 1998) . Despite evidence of a spatial dimension to the Liberal Democrat vote, albeit at the local election level, the findings were largely circumstantial, however,and were not based onspatial econometric modelling techniques to takeaccount of possible spatial autocorrelation in the residuals. But these findings did suggest that where parties (Liberal Democrats in this case) spent relatively high amounts on campaigning in one local area, they could reap electoral rewards from spatially autocorrelated influences if large amounts were also spent in contiguous areas.This argument was tested using spatial regression techniques by Cutts and Webber (2010) . Their findings were conclusive: constituencies were not spatially independent, with campaign spillover effects having a positive influence on party performance, particularly in the case of the Liberal Democrats.Given this, we expect that vote shares in constituency i will be influenced by intense party activism during both the long and the shortcampaign in i's neighbouring constituencies. Spatial econometric techniques are therefore used here to assess whether there was any spillover effects of party activity, during both campaign periods, at the constituency level in the 2010 general election.
2 Feedback forces are likely to be particularly evident at the smaller the spatial scale because of the higher likelihood and frequency of contact between voters (Voss et al, 2006) . Where the impression of apolitical partyis positive, then thisis likely to be shared with friends and neighbourswithin the area and within contiguous areas who interact most with these voters.According to agent interaction theory, one might expect some spillover effects with a positive correlation in political party vote shares between contiguous parliamentary constituencies (Irwin and Bockstael, 2004) . This is one potential source of spatial autocorrelationbut it is not the primary focus of this paper. 3 Grouping forces are where individuals with shared characteristics are found clustered together by choice or they are constrained to co-locate by social, political or economic forces e.g. individuals in poverty subject to the operation of the local labour market. It is also important to note that spatial nonindependence may be present but the processescreating the outcome might not themselves be intrinsically spatial. See the following literature for a more detailed overview of why autocorrelated residuals occur (Voss et al, 2006; Anselin, 2001 ).
The2010 General Election: The Changing Electoral Context
For the first time in thirteen years, Labour was widely expected to lose the 2010 general election. Following the 2005 general election, the party fell behind the Conservatives in the opinion polls and experienced heavy losses in both local elections and the 2009 European election during the electoral cycle. While Labour adopted an almost entirely defensive electoral strategy at the constituency level (Johnston et al., 2011 (Johnston et al., , 2012 , the Conservatives targeted a substantial number of key seats where they lost in 2005 up to three years in advance of the 2010general election (Ashcroft, 2010; Johnston and Pattie, 2010) . Although theyexpected to win the election, whether they would gain an overall majority in the House of Commons was much less certain. The party needed to gain 116 seats to form the next government, whichrequired one of thelargestUK electionswingsin its favoursince 1945. The Liberal Democrats had polled solidly around the 20% mark since 2005 and hoped to benefit from disillusionment with Labour in its northern heartlands. Much less certain was how they would fare against a resurgent Conservative party in the South, particularly in those seats the Liberal Democrats weredefending with relatively small margins;the retirement of popular Liberal Democrat local incumbents further threatened to lead to Conservativegainsat their expense. While each party integrated its national and local campaigns, intensive activism was focused on their key target seats. Despite the changing electoral context from five years previously, did intensive party campaigning matter? Was it effective in the months leading up to the 'official campaign'? And were thereany positive spillover effects from party campaign effort in 2010: were thevote shares in constituency i influenced by highly visible party activism both over short and longcampaign in i's neighbouring constituencies?
To examine the impact of local party campaigning on party support in 2010 we employlinear regression models.Here we use candidate campaign spendingas the measure of campaign intensity.Thishas two main advantages. First, a number of studies have stressed the validity and reliability of party spending as a surrogate measure given that it correlates strongly with individual contact data aggregated from the British Electoral Study surveysand survey information directly from individuals (party agents) who organise their party's election campaign (Denver and Hands, 1997; Pattie, 1995,2006) . Second, political parties are legally required to make returns of theirelection expenses to the Electoral Commission which has made thempublicly available,thus ensuring near universal coverage with spending records for each party standing in every seat at the 2010 general election, although our analyses here are restricted to the three largest British parties that fought all but one of the constituencies in 2010 (the exception was that defended by the Speaker).
Candidate spending is legally capped. The size of that cap varies from constituency to constituency, and is affected by two factors:the constituency electorate (larger electorates generate higher caps than smaller ones); and whether the constituency is a borough (more urban) or county (more rural) seat, on the grounds that, other things being equal, the costs of campaigning are higherin the latter than in the former, due to the lower population densities and greater travel costs in rural rather than urban areas.It is therefore sensible (as in other studies using these data) to standardise this measure by calculating a candidate's spending as a percentage of the legal maximum permitted in the constituency (Johnston and Pattie, 1995; Pattie and Johnston, 2009) .While party candidates continued to be legally restricted in the amount that the could spend for the short campaign, 4 new legislation came into force before the 2010 general election which placed additional restrictions on what they could spend for a longer period of time. During the long campaigncandidates were allowed to spend nearly two and half times as much as the legal expenditure limit for the 'official or short campaign period (Johnston et al, 2011 (Johnston et al, , 2012 .
5 Weanalyseparty candidate spending during the short and longcampaignseparately, with the short campaignvariable orthogonalised to remove any potential collinearity problems between the two variables.
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Our models also include social cleavage variablesindicating the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the constituency populations (derived from the 2001 census). These are not only relatively stable and exogenous but have long been established as important determinants of voting for Labour and the Conservatives because those parties tend to do better or worse in areas depending on the types of people who live there (Cutts, 2006 ). The situation is somewhat different for the Liberal Democrats, however (Curtice, 1996) . While there is some evidence that Liberal Democrat voters tend to be more middle classthan average, havedegrees, and work in the public sector (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005) , the party (unlike the other main parties) lacksa natural support base and its areas of relative strength in general reflect long periods of developing a local party organisation and support, with success in local government elections providing the foundations for Parliamentary campaigns.We useeightvariables taken from the 2001 census whichhave been used in numerous constituency levelanalysestoexaminevoting patterns atrecent general elections (Johnston et al, 1998; Fieldhouse et al, 2006; Cutts and Webber, 2010) .
In 2010, Labour was expected to lose some support in student areas given the Liberal Democrats' opposition to university tuition fees and their efforts to target younger voters (Cutts, 2012) . While the Liberal Democrats had improved their performance in 2005in those areas, at Labour's expense, they didn't manage to make the gains expectedin constituencies with large Muslim electorates. In 2010, opposition to the War in Afghanistan had replaced the War in Iraq as a salient issue (opposition to which had gained the Liberal Democrats considerable support in 2005). In an attempt to appeal to the hard fought-forMuslim vote, the Liberal Democrats oftenreminded electors of their Anti-Iraq war stance in order to maximise supportin those seats with a high proportion of Muslim voters.Three of the census variables (the percentages of Muslims, students and people working in education) were selected to explore whether the Liberal Democrats performed better in areas where those groups comprised a relatively large share of the local population; the other five (the percentages with degrees, working in either manufacturing or agriculture, homeowners, and pensioners) were selected to represent the long-established social cleavages that should discriminate between support for Labour and the Conservatives.
Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis: The 2010 General Election
A series of exploratory tests were conducted to examine spatial patterning in the geography of voting at the 2010 general election. Moran's I is a measure of global spatial autocorrelation or overall clustering in a dataset, providing a formal indication of the extent of linear association between a vector of standardised observed values and a weighted average of standardised values for neighbouring observations (in this case constituencies). The type and strength of spatial autocorrelation is commonly visualised in a Moran scatter plot where the slope of the regression line corresponds to the I value (Anselin, 1996) , the extent to which support for each politicalparty in each constituency is correlated with that party's share in contiguous constituencies.
In each Moran's I scatter plot for voting patterns(Figure1), the relevant party's standardised vote share in 2010 in a constituencyis on the x-axisand they-axis shows the standardised value of itsaverage vote share inneighbouring constituenciesas defined by aqueen contiguity weights matrix(i.e. all constituencies with which it has a common boundary). 7 The four quadrants on the scatter-plot indicate different types of local association. The upper right (high-high) and bottom left (low-low) quadrants depict positive spatial association. The former in Figure 1 contains those constituencies with above average party support which share boundaries with neighbouring parliamentary constituencies that also have above average values of the same party's vote share. The latter incorporates those constituencies with party support below the mean with neighbouring parliamentary constituencies also with below average values. By contrast, the upper left (low-high) and bottom right (highlow) quadrants depict negative spatial association;the former contains constituencies with below average vote shares surrounded by parliamentary constituencies that have party support above the mean, while the latter depicts the opposite.
Insert Figure1a-1c
Figures1a-1cindicatethespatial autocorrelation in the 2010 voting patterns: the Moran's I statistics are positive and statistically significant with values of 0.31, 0.66 and 0.64 for the Liberal Democrats, Conservatives and Labour parties respectively; the degree of spatial autocorrelation isthusstrongest for the latter two parties, indicating that there is greater spatial clustering ofparty performance across constituenciesfor the Conservative and Labour parties. The Liberal Democrats' support is closer to arandom distribution -that this ismuch more localised is indicatedby the greater dispersion of values in the high-high quadrant in Figure 1a than in Figures 1b-1candthe intensity of values in the low-low quadrant, which suggests that there are substantial tracts of neighbouring constituencies where the Liberal Democrats obtained relatively small shares of the votes cast.
Was the pattern of spending by each party alsospatially correlated, with constituencies with relatively high levels clustered alongside others with similarly high values? Figures 2a-2carescatter -plots for spending on the long campaign; the xaxes show the party's expenditure in the constituency and the y-axes its average expenditure in the adjacent constituencies.
8 They indicate some clusteringespecially in the low-low quadrant (parts of the country where a party spent below the average in most constituencies -but the slopecoefficients are much smaller than for the pattern of voting: 0.13, 0.15 and 0.10 for the Liberal Democrats, Conservatives and Labour respectively. There was much greater spatial clustering in spending on the short campaign, however (Figures 3a-3c) , especially for the Conservatives (I=0.30) and Labour (0.28); the coefficient for the Liberal Democrats was considerably smaller (0.20), reflecting the greater scatter of points in Figure 3c . 9 In each case, alongside the clustering of constituencies in the low-low quadrant indicating parts of the country where there was little spending in neighbouring constituencies there was also a large number of observations in the high-high quadrant (relative to the small numbers in the other two quadrants where there was no clustering of constituencies with similar spending levels).
Insert Figures2a-2c
Insert Figures3a-3c In general, therefore, the pattern of spending by each of the parties during both of the campaign periods was non-random: each party tended to spend above average amounts in neighbouring constituencies in some parts of the country and below average in clusters elsewhere. Maps of the distribution of seats in thefour quadrants (termed LISA -Local Indicators of Spatial Association -maps) indicate where those clusters are present (Figures 4-9 ).
Insert Figures4-5
For the Liberal Democrats, Figures 4 and 5identify clusters of constituencies where spending was at relatively high levels for both campaigns -notably in one of its major electoral heartlands of the Southwest andSouthwest London (Twickenham, Richmond Park), especially for the short campaign, andin parts of the Southeast around Southampton and Portsmouth (where the party has held several seats at recent elections). There were also clusters of high spending duringthe short campaign in other parts of London notably in South London near Bermondsey, Camberwell and Peckham, andmoving northwards in the twoIslington constituencies and a number of neighbouring seats. Clusters of constituencies where spending was below average were in parts of urban England (notably Greater Manchester and Merseyside) plus Scotland's central belt and in the eastern parts of London. Over most of the rest of the country there is no significant pattern.
Insert Figures 6-7
Comparable patterns are shown for Conservative spending. During the long campaign (Figure 6 ), there were clusters of above average spending in the Southwest of England and Southwest parts of London (Richmond Park, Wimbledon, Putney etc), and of below average spending in the major urban conurbations of the north and midlands, plus South Wales and central Scotland. The two majorclustersof high average spending (Southwest of England and Southwest parts of London) expanded substantially during the short campaign (Figure 7) ,and wasjoined by another in the Southeast: there were clusters of below-average spending then in the same urbanindustrial areas.
Insert Figures 8-9
Finally, the maps for Labourare to a considerable extent a mirror image of those for its opponents. Labour spent relatively little on the long campaign (Johnston et al., 2011 (Johnston et al., , 2012 and there were no clusters of seats where it spentabove-average levels (Figure 8 )outsideLondon, where clusters of high spending were evident in the central southern parts ofLondon (the Croydon seats and incorporating Putney and Battersea), but also in the north of the capital, from Westminster North to seats near Finchley and around Enfield. There were, however, large tracts of the country in the low-low quadrant, which correspond mainly to areas where the other two parties spent relatively large amounts on their campaigns. The latter feature was accentuated in the short campaign, notably across much of southern England, but there were also clusters of constituencies with above average spending, mainly in the English urban areas (though not also those in Wales and Scotland) where the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats spent relatively little (Figure 9 ).London again proved an exception with clusters of high average spending in the Central parts, across constituencies moving eastwards from the centre and Northwest near Ealing and Harrow.
Regression Analysis
The exploratory evidence presented in both the Moran's I scatter plots and the LISA cluster maps suggestsgeographical elementsto both party vote share and spending patterns in Britainat the 2010 general election.Are the two related: did each party perform better in those clusters of seats where it spent more? In addition, were there any spillover effects for the spending? Did a party perform better -all other factors having been taken into consideration -in constituencies where it spent more onthe two campaigns in neighbouring constituenciesand, complementing that question, did it perform less well in seats where its opponents spent aboveaverage amounts not only there but also intheirneighbouring constituencies? In thissection we report on a series of regression models to address these questions. First, we estimate an OLS model for each of the three main parties to examine the effects of the party activism during the long and the shortcampaign on party support. Second, we run similar models but explicitly test for spatial autocorrelation in the spending variablesto explore whether there were spillover effects; this is done by augmenting the model to include compound variables corresponding to the six short and longparty spending variables that have been multiplied by the queen contiguity weight matrix.Finally, following statistical evidence that the errors of these OLS regressions with spatially lagged spending variables are spatially autocorrelated(i.e. in the dependent variable) we re-estimate the second set of regressionsusing a spatial error modelling technique.
The general pattern
The first set of OLS models includesthe traditional socio-economic variables as well asparty spending variables for the short and longcampaign. 10 The results are in Table  1which includes a number of model diagnostic tools (R 2 , AIC, Log Likelihood etc) to assess the improvement in fit during the modelling stages.
The R 2 values indicatethat the explanatory variables account fora large proportion in the variation in2010vote sharesfor all three parties.As expected, the social cleavage variables are more important influenceson the pattern of support for the Conservatives and Labour than the Liberal Democrats. Conservative support was most evident in thoseconstituencies which contained a large number of people with degrees and those that owned their own homewhile Labour tendedto perform best in more deprived areas, particularly in constituencies with fewer owner-occupiers. Labour also performedwell in constituencies with large numbers of people working in education, indicative of its support among public sector workers in general (Curtice et al., 2010) . But large numbers of studentsin a constituency were associated with low levels of Labour support,probably reflecting discontent with Labour's policy to increase tuition fees(opposed by the Liberal Democrats, who polled strongly in university towns). The relative number of students in a constituencywas the only coefficient among the eight census variables that was statistically significant in the analysis for that party,further evidence that the Liberal Democratslacked acoherent socio-economic support base.
Insert Table 1 Turning to theeffects of place-based campaigning in the months preceding the election and during the 'official' campaign (the short and long campaigns in Table 1 ), significant and positive regression coefficients for all partiesshow thatspending on each of the campaigns was significantly related to their 2010 vote share.Spending on the longcampaign has not been analysed for previous elections, but the results here show that it mattered for all three parties. Where theycommitted resources and were active in the months preceding the 'official' campaign, their local candidates improved their performance; indeed it was particularly important for theLiberal Democrats (coefficient 0.31). This provides further evidence that grassroots activism before the 'official' campaign -where parties socialise their vote before the mobilising phase of the campaign in the last weeks before the election -is not only vital for local parties but also highly effective .The Liberal Democrats are adept at targeted intensive grassroots campaigning, not only at election time but all year round, to enhance their performance in general elections (Cutts, 2006) ; they spent relatively little in many seats on the 2010 long campaign (Figure 4 ), but where they did, it had a substantial impact.
As well as having a positive impact on its own performance, each party's campaign spending also had a negative impact on its rivals' vote shares (with two exceptions: Conservative long and short campaign spending on Liberal Democrat vote share). Thus the more the Liberal Democrats spent on the longcampaign the worse the Conservatives and Labour did; the comparable impact of short campaign spending was also significant but less substantial. This suggests that continuous or sustained prior interaction with voters not only brought the Liberal Democrats electoral benefits but also had a substantial effect on both the other parties' electoral performance. The Conservatives spent much more than the other two parties on the long campaign, especially in seats where it was targeting Labour incumbents, and this also brought dividends -although the relative size of the two coefficients suggests that its short campaign spending had a greater impact on Labour's vote share.
Spatial Autocorrelation of Party Spending Variables
To identify whether there were any spillover effectsof a party's spending on its and its opponents' performance in neighbouring constituenciesTable 2 reports a further set of models in which the compound spatial lag spending variables have been added to the same explanatory variables as in the previous models.These threemodels, therefore,explicitly test the impact of socio-economic explanatory variables and party spending variables on party vote share along with the spatial autocorrelation of each party spending variable from both campaign periods.
Insert Table 2 For all three parties, the inclusion of these compound spending variables led to an improvement in fit (R 2 ) and a reduction in the log-likelihood test. In both the Labour and Conservative regression models, some of the socio-economic explanatory variables became insignificant following the inclusion of the compound variables. The coefficients for theparty spending variables also reduced in magnitude but remained significant in the direction specified in Table 1 ;for the Liberal Democrats these indicatethat the non-compound variables remained at a similar magnitude and statistical significance.The only slightdifference from the previous modelswas the significant small negative effectof theConservative longcampaign on Liberal Democrat support. Of the three parties, the Liberal Democrats werestillthe party to benefit most from intensive localcampaigningin the constituency itself.
The coefficients for the compound variables indicate, first, that the more all three parties spenton campaigning in constituencies adjacent to constituency i the more votes theygotin constituency i, forboth campaign periods. For all three parties, therefore, campaigning in constituencies is not spatially independent. Second, during the long campaignperiod each party benefitedfrom the spillover effects of its own campaigning. Third, of the three main parties, the more the Conservatives spentonthe short campaign in constituencies adjacent to constituency i the more votes theygot in constituency i. Labour also benefited from such spillover effectsbut to a smaller extent (a coefficient of 0.15 compared to 0.22 for the Conservatives); each party's spending also had a similar negative impact on its opponent's performance (negative coefficients of -0.16 and -0.18 respectively).Where the Liberal Democrats were active during the shortcampaign in seats adjacent to constituency i, the party significantly increased support in this constituencybut without any significant negative impact on either of its opponents' performance.
A spatial error model
While the regressions in Table 2 explicitly take account of spillover effects through the inclusion of lagged spending variables, they don't also take account of whether the spatial heterogeneity of the dependent variables has a direct effect onvote shareswhether its performance in one constituency was relatedto its performance in adjacent seats. Theexploratory evidence presentedearlierclearly suggestedthe presence of a geographical clusteringto party vote shares. Given this, the regressions werere-estimated using thecorrect functional form with such spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable explicitly incorporated.Two types of regression model -the spatial lag model 11 and the spatial error model -are typically used to determine the influence of such spatial relationships (Neumayer and Plumper 2012) .Here we examinedthe model diagnostics of the previous modelsand found that the spatial dependence for all three parties entered through the errors rather than through a systematic component of the model. 12 Given that the errors of the OLS regressions in Table 2 were spatially correlated, the regressions were re-estimated using a spatial error model. The results are shown in Table 3 .
Insert Table 3 A coefficient on the spatial errors (lambda) is included as an additional indicator. It is positive and highly significant for all three parties and as a result the general model fits improved.The model diagnostics suggest that far more of the variation in Conservative and Labour vote shareswas explained after taking account of spatially correlated errors. But whilethereare significant increases in the R 2 for these two parties, there is only a slight improvement in the Liberal Democrat model. This is confirmed by the magnitude of changes in log-likelihoodand AICvalues, whichis greatest for the Conservative partyand smallest for the Liberal Democrats, with thelow value for the latterprobably reflectingconcentration of this party's vote sharein the South West.Nonetheless, the inclusion of space considerably improves the predictive power of the model for each political party.
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Once we re-estimate the models using spatial regression techniques, it is clear thatthe importance of socioeconomic explanations on Labour and Conservative party support had been understatedin Table 2 . In 2010, the Conservatives secured more supportinaffluentand rural constituencies which contained large numbers of retired people and homeowners. By contrast, the Labour vote was higherin their manufacturing heartlands and those seats with a large Muslim population. The Liberal Democrat model remained fairly stable. The only noticeable difference was the decline in support in seats as the number of Muslims increased, suggesting that the Muslim 'protest vote' against Labour in 2005 wasn't repeated five years later. The size, direction and significance of the non-compound spending variables for all three parties across both campaign periods remained largely unchanged. There was also little change in the lagged spending variables. Using the spatial error modelling technique did marginally affect the size of the Labour and Conservative lagged spending coefficientsduring the shortcampaign but the significance of these variables remained strong and in the direction previously stated.
The Impact of Spending
Figures 10a -10c present the profiles of the impacts of long campaign spending in constituency i, the spillover effects onto constituencies i from campaign spending in its contiguous constituencies, andthe effect of these two combined, estimated respectivelyfrom the regressions in table 3.In each case, the values of all variables except that being considered (i.e. spending by each party) are held constant at their means while that of the one under consideration is varied to evaluate its impact, ceteris paribus, on the dependent variable.
Insert Figure 10a-10c This evidence presented in Figure 10a corroborates the belief that the effect of long campaign spending in constituency i on vote share varies between the parties. Although all three parties experience an increase in vote share due to campaign spending, the Liberal Democrats benefit the most and the Conservatives benefit the least. Under the fitted model and as illustrated through the slopes of the lines, an increase in campaign spending of 1 percentage point increases the voteshares of the Liberal Democrats, Labour and Conservatives by 0.3, 0.19 and 0.1 percentage points, respectively.
The spillover effects on constituency i's vote share of long campaign spending in constituency i's contiguousconstituencies also vary betweenparties, as shownin Figure 10b . As one might expect, these effects on vote share are smaller than the effects of campaign spending on one's own constituency detailed previously, but they remain both statistically significantand substantial. Under the fitted model, an increase in campaign spending of 1 percentage point in constituency i's contiguous constituencies increasesLiberal Democrat, Labour and Conservative vote shares by 0.08, 0.08 and 0.11 percentage points respectively. However, the fact that the differences between these slope coefficients are statistically insignificant misses the point. If the Liberal Democrats were to increase their campaign spending in constituency i's contiguousconstituencies by 20 percentage points (say, from 0per centto 20per cent) then they would experience an increase in vote share of 1.6 percentage points; this represents a 9.6 percent increase in their vote share from 16.7 to 18.3 percentage points. A increase in Conservative campaign spending in constituency i's contiguousconstituencies by 20 percentage points (again from 0per centto 20per cent) would also result in an increase in vote share of 1.6 percentage points from 28.6 to 30.2 percentage points, but this representsa smaller increase in their overall vote share of 5.6 percent. Hence, in relative terms, the effects on constituency i's vote share of long campaign spending in neighbouringconstituencies are much more important for the Liberal Democrats than for the other two parties.
14 Figure 10c shows these two effectscombined. It illustrates that, for example, if the Liberal Democrats had been able to push their long campaign expenditure up uniformly in all seats by enough to shift their average long campaign % spending up by 250%, from 1% to 42%, and if all other variables -including the other parties' spending -had been held at their national averages, then the Liberal Democrats would have gained more votes nationally than either of the other two main parties.
15
Insert Figure 11 Figure 11 shows thecomparable profiles for these two effects combined but this time when applied to the short campaign. The profiles have a high degree of similarity, with slopes at 0.28, 0.275 and 0.267 for the Labour, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats parties respectively; as the initial values (intercepts) are very similar it also illustrates the effects of short campaign spending patterns are similar across the three parties.
Conclusion
Targeted campaign messages are an integral part of the post-modern election campaign. At the national level, parties strategically control how their leader, candidates and policies are presented in the24 hournewsmediato get their message across to target voters. Locally, often with assistance from outside the constituency, the partyfocuses efforts on key marginal seats with attempts to targetvoters both prior to and during the election campaign. In the years preceding the general election, local parties work hard to socialise voters, promote the candidate and maintain a visible presence. Come election time, as constituency party activism reaches its peak, parties seek to mobilise their own vote and capture those undecided electors who can make the difference between winning and losing. This is borne out by our findings here. Local constituency electioneering during both campaign periods have a significant effect on party support. Moreover, constituencies are not spatially independent, with campaign spillover effects influencing party performance in nearby constituencies in both campaign periods. Although many studies suggest that spatial factors might be influencing party vote shares, few continue to take explicit account of spatial factors in their empiricalanalyses. Apart from failing to acknowledge possible spillover effects, ignoring spatial effects can lead tobiased results, with the determinants of party vote share, particularly for Labour and the Conservatives, being either over-or under-stated when space is omitted from the regression analysis.
For Labour and the Conservatives, geography(local context) has an important influence along with other more established drivers of party support. The Conservatives in particular benefited from campaign spillover effectsin 2010, not only improving their own support in nearby seats, but restricting Labour. However, our findings suggest that intensive grassroots campaigning is particularly salient to the electoral fortunes of the Liberal Democrats. Whilst this finding is not entirely surprising, of particular interest is that intensiveLiberal Democrat campaigning proved more effective in the months preceding the 'official' election period than in the three week election campaign itself. Not only did it boost the Liberal Democrats' own support, but it had a significant negative impact on both Labour and Conservative vote share. In addition, the spatial autocorrelation analyses reported above show that all parties, but particularly the Liberal Democrats, also gained more votes in a constituency when they campaigned hard in surrounding seats than when they did not. During both campaign periods, but particularly in the long campaign', spillover effects significantly influenced Liberal Democrat party performance in nearby constituencies. This represents an important substantive finding which builds onfindings from analyses oflocal elections (Dorling, Rallings and Thrasher, 1998; Cutts, 2006a) and at the previous general election during the 'official' campaign period (Cutts and Webber, 2010) .
Part of the explanation lies inthe Liberal Democrats' use of grassroots campaigning outside the election period to maintain a visible local presence (Cutts, 2006a) . Between general elections, winning council seats and running local councils is used to gain greater electoral credibility and provide a platform for parliamentary success (Ashdown, 2010) . The Liberal Democrats also use grassroots campaigning to recruit local activists and party workers which cements the local party infrastructure and enables the party to be more effective in targeting local resources. Therefore, maintainingavisible campaign presence not just at election times but from one election to the next not only aids the promotion of the local Liberal Democrat parliamentary candidate but also provides the resources to socialise their vote well in advance of the general election. The combination of traditional and modern campaign methods and a visible presence on the ground also enhances the party's performance in neighbouring constituencies.
Party spending in the long campaign period is, therefore, likely to be a good measure of campaign intensity during that pre-election period. With fewer resources than the other main parties, the Liberal Democrats are only going to spend large amounts in those seats which had sustained activism throughout the electoral cycle. Of course, such findings were evident for the Liberal Democrats in the 2010 general election. Now in coalition government with the Conservatives, it remains to be seen whether the party can sustain the level of campaign activism over the electoral cycle in the face of large scale losses to its local base. The party will need to adapt its grassroots campaigning, local tactics and strategy to reflect the fact that the party is no longer in opposition if it is going to reap similar electoral rewards and positive spillover effects in the next general election,and not return to pre 1997 levels of parliamentary representation.
More generally, this paper goes beyond reinforcing the received wisdom on local electioneering. It is not onlyone of the few papers to examine spillover effects in local campaigns in Britain, but the first to apply to the long as well as the short campaign. It stresses that future empirical analyses of voting at the constituency scale must explicitly take accountof spatial heterogeneity in order to correctly gauge the magnitude and significance of factors that affect parties' parliamentary performance. 
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